# 1NC

## Off

#### Interpretation: To win, the aff must defend that it would be a good idea for the United States federal government to enact a topical, hypothetical example of the resolution

**“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum**

**Army Officer School ‘04**

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**“USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means**

**Ericson ‘03**

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The **entire debate** is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**Vote Neg**

**First is preparation and clash—changing the question post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent**

**Second is decisionmaking**

**A limited topic of discussion is key to inculcation of decision-making and advocacy skills – even if their position is contestable that’s distinct from being debatable – this still allows innovation, but avoids statements of fact**

**Steinberg,** lecturer of communication studies – University of Miami, **and Freeley**, Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, **‘8**

(David L. and Austin J., Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making p. 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

**The discussion of specific policy questions is key to skill development – we control uniqueness – university students already have preconceived ideological notions of the way the world operates – governmental policy discussions is key to force engagement with competing perspectives**

**Esberg & Sagan 12** \*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Third is limits

#### The affirmative’s vision of debate obliterates every part of your life outside debate

Harris, 13

Scott Harris, debate genius; “Scott Harris NDT Final Round Ballot,” 4/5/2013, http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.msg10246#new //bghs-ms

For me the negative under develops the extent to which a forced choice that excludes the affirmative approach in every debate is essential. I think the negative should have developed more of a traditional limits type argument. The argument that allowing this affirmative to make the debate about their social location would enable every debate to be framed about a different social location and that there would be a tremendous incentive for fewer and fewer debates to talk about the topic. That the permutation is a bad idea because in the world of the permutation there would be a vested interest in more and more debates crowding out the political debates. In other words, I think the link to the loss of traditional political research and debate from embracing the affirmatives approach in some debates is not developed enough by the negative. The 2NR does say that under the affirmative vision there would be no limits to what the affirmative talks about but the focus is on how that impacts on the ability of the negative to prepare for debates rather than making it about an argument of what debate would look like in the world of the permutation. The negative could also have argued for the importance of Quare individuals specifically to discuss questions of politics and energy policy in particular or answered more specifically the affirmatives assertions that government policy had no relevance to them. The affirmative Quare specificity arguments are late breaking in the debate since they only appear in CX and in rebuttals but the negative does not really address them explicitly. Had these arguments for why the permutation was a bad idea been developed more I would most likely have voted negative in this debate. I am sure that Northwestern’s reaction to this explanation will be to feel “that is what we said.” While I think it is the implicit intent behind their arguments I do not believe that these arguments as a response to the perm are explored sufficiently in the 2NR. I believe that the permutation absorbs most of the negatives offense for why policy debates will be good and then some debates that encourage performative resistance will also be good. I think the negative wins that the framework argument itself is not violent and that voting negative to exclude the aff would not be an act of violence. That does not mean, however, that there is not an inclusion advantage to voting affirmative.

#### Harris continues…

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwestern’s strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporia’s argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair. Northwestern’s framework argument did engage Emporia’s argument. Emporia said that you should vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwestern’s argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvard’s eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myself—I could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself—why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework is a world that says this community doesn’t care whether its participants have a life or do well in school or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are bidirectional will not make teams that won’t debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about anything they want to talk about without having to debate against topicality or framework arguments are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and **not a very good home** in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday existence.

## Off

#### **Obsession with language and human communication replicates anthropocentric norms**

**Bell and Russel 2k** (Anne C. Bell, department of education, York University, Canada, and Constance L. Russel, Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, Lakehead University, Co-Editor, Canadian Journal of Environmental Education, “Beyond Human, Beyond Words: Anthropocentrism, Critical Pedagogy, and the Poststructuralist Turn,” CANADIAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 25, 3 (2000):188–203, http://www.csse-scee.ca/CJE/Articles/FullText/CJE25-3/CJE25-3-bell.pdf)

Although we acknowledge the important contribution of poststructuralism to analyses of oppression, privilege, and power in education, we believe that educators must continue to probe its limitations and implications. Accordingly, we consider here how poststructuralism, as it is taken up within critical pedagogy, tends to reinforce rather than subvert deepseated humanist assumptions about humans and nature by taking for granted the “borders” (as in Giroux, 1991) that define nature as the devalued Other. We ask what meanings and voices have been pre-empted by the virtually exclusive focus on humans and human language in a humancentred epistemological framework. At the same time, we discuss how relationships between language, communication, and meaningful experience are being conceptualized outside the field of critical pedagogy (in some cases from a poststructuralist perspective) to call into question these very assumptions. Although we concentrate primarily on societal narratives that shape understandings of human and nature, we also touch on two related issues of language: the “forgetting” of nonverbal, somatic experience and the misplaced presumption of human superiority based on linguistic capabilities. In so doing, our intention is to deal constructively with some of the anthropocentric blind spots within critical pedagogy generally and within poststructuralist approaches to critical pedagogy in particular. We hope to illuminate places where these streams of thought and practice move in directions compatible with our own aspirations as educators.

**Anthropocentrism guarantees violence—humanism is the *original* hierarchy—we need politics that can respect more than human life. Their politics dooms us to a future that endlessly repeats the oppression of the status quo.**

**Best 2007** (Steven – Chair of Philosophy @ University of Texas – El Paso, Review of Charles Patterson’s “The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust”, Journal for Critical Animal Studies, <http://www.drstevebest.org/EternalTriblenka.pdf>) //MD

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that **the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.** ¶ In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that **the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power.** A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions. ¶ Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings.¶ The Origins of Hierarchy¶ "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras¶ It is little understood that **the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.** Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for **all other systems of domination** such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” ¶ Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons. The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females. ¶ In the fifteenth century, **when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves.** Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation. ¶ As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means. ¶ Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for **speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples.** “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.” Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.” ¶ Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals. The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.” Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.” For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command. ¶ There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Christianity left behind.¶

**Our alternative is to endorse the thought experiment of the voluntary global suicide of humanity – that solves**

**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion – the global suicide of humanity – as a free-willed and ‘final solution’. While we are not interested in the discussion of the ‘method’ of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

## Case

#### The 1AC presents black culture as pure resistance to whiteness – this totalizing conception denies individuality and reinforces racist binaries

Quashie, 12 (Kevin Quash, associate professor of African American Studies at Smith College; “The Sovereignty of Quiet: Beyond Resistance in Black Culture,” 6/26/2012, pg. 3-4)

This book explores what a concept of quiet could mean to how we think about black culture. The exploration is a shift in how we commonly understand blackness, which is often described as expressive, dramatic, or loud. These qualities inherently reflect the equivalence between resistance and blackness. Resistance is, in fact, the dominant expectation we have of black culture. Indeed, this expectation is so widely familiar that it does not require explanation or qualification; it is practically unconscious. These assumptions are noticeable in the ways that blackness serves as an emblem of social ailment and progress. In an essay from his 1957 collection White Mun Listerd, Richard Wright captures this sentiment, noting that “The Negro is America’s metaphor" (109), Wright’s comment might be hyperbolic, but it also summarizes the exceptional role that black experience has played in American social consciousness: Blackness here is not a term of intimacy or human vagary but of publicness. One result of this dynamic is a quality of self-consciousness. In black literature, a hyperawareness of a reader whose presence -whether critical or sympathetic - shapes what is expressed. Such self-consciousness is an example of the concept of doubleness that has become the preeminent trope of black cultural studies. The result is that black culture is celebrated for the exemplary ways it employs doubleness as well as for its capacity to manipulate social opinion and challenge racism. This is the politics of representation, where black subjectivity exists for its social and political meaningfulness rather than as a marker of the human individuality of the person who is black. As an identity, blackness is always supposed to tell us something about race or racism, or about America, or violence and struggle and triumph or poverty and hopefulness. **The determination** to see blackness only through a social public lens, as if there were no inner life, **is racist**-it comes from the language of racial superiority and is a practice intended to dehumanize black people. But it has also been adopted by black culture, especially in terms of nationalism, but also more generally: it creeps into the consciousness of the black subject, especially the artist, as the imperative to represent. Such expectation is part of the inclination to understand black culture through a lens of resistance, and it practically thwarts other ways of reading. All of this suggests that the common frameworks for thinking about blackness are limited.

#### Hip hop is inevitably marketed to white consumers – turns black culture into a commodity that can be tossed away

Hartigan 5(John Hartigan, prof of anthropology @ UT, PhD from University of California, Santa Cruz; South Atlantic Quarterly 104.3, Summer, “Culture against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis”)

One might be tempted to assume that Gilroy’s stance is largely polemical, but his critique is thoroughgoing, as is his call to reject ‘‘this desire to cling on to ‘race’ and go on stubbornly and unimaginatively seeing the world on the distinctive scales that it has specified.’’ In spite of powerful, novel efforts to fundamentally transform racial analysis—such as the emergence of ‘‘whiteness studies’’ or analyses of the ‘‘new racism’’—Gilroy is emphatic in ‘‘demand[ing] liberation not from white supremacy alone, however urgently that is required, but from all racializing and raciological thought, from racialized seeing, racialized thinking, and racialized thinking about thinking’’ (40). In contrast to Visweswaran—and, interestingly, voicing concerns over ‘‘cultural politics’’ that resonate with Dominguez’s critique—Gilroy sees a host of problems in ‘‘black political cultures’’ that rely on ‘‘essentialist approaches to building solidarity’’ (38).14 Nor does he share Harrison’s confidence in making racism the centerpiece of critical cultural analysis. Gilroy plainly asserts that ‘‘the starting point of this book is that the era of New Racism is emphatically over’’ (34). A singular focus on racism precludes an attention to ‘‘the appearance of sharp intraracial conflicts’’ and does not effectively address the ‘‘several new forms of determinism abroad’’ (38, 34). We still must be prepared ‘‘to give effective answers to the pathological problems represented by genomic racism, the glamour of sameness, and the eugenic projects currently nurtured by their confluence’’ (41). But the diffuse threats posed by invocations of racially essentialized identities (shimmering in ‘‘the glamour of sameness’’) as the basis for articulating ‘‘black political cultures’’ entails an analytical approach that countervails against positing racism as the singular focus of inquiry and critique.15 From Gilroy’s stance, to articulate a ‘‘postracial humanism’’ we must disable any form of racial vision and ensure that it can never again be reinvested with explanatory power. But what will take its place as a basis for talking about the dynamics of belonging and differentiation that profoundly shape social collectives today? Gilroy tries to make clear that it will not be ‘‘culture,’’ yet this concept infuses his efforts to articulate an alternative conceptual approach. Gilroy conveys many of the same reservations about culture articulated by the anthropologists listed above. Specifically, Gilroy cautions that ‘‘the culturalist approach still runs the risk of naturalizing and normalizing hatred and brutality by presenting them as inevitable consequences of illegitimate attempts to mix and amalgamate primordially incompatible groups’’ (27). In contrast, Gilroy expressly prefers the concept of diaspora as a means to ground a new form of attention to collective identities. ‘‘As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race,’ nation, and bounded culture coded into the body,’’ Gilroy finds that ‘‘diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and historical mechanics of belonging’’ (123). Furthermore, ‘‘by focusing attention equally on the sameness within differentiation and the differentiation within sameness, diaspora disturbs the suggestion that political and cultural identity might be understood via the analogy of indistinguishable peas lodged in the protective pods of closed kinship and subspecies’’ (125). And yet, in a manner similar to Harrison’s prioritizing of racism as a central concern for social inquiry, when it comes to specifying what diaspora entails and how it works, vestiges of culture reemerge as a basis for the coherence of this new conceptual focus. When Gilroy delineates the elements and dimensions of diaspora, culture provides the basic conceptual background and terminology. In characterizing ‘‘the Atlantic diaspora and its successor-cultures,’’ Gilroy sequentially invokes ‘‘black cultural styles’’ and ‘‘postslave cultures’’ that have ‘‘supplied a platform for youth cultures, popular cultures, and styles of dissent far from their place of origin’’ (178). Gilroy explains how the ‘‘cultural expressions’’ of hip-hop and rap, along with other expressive forms of ‘‘black popular culture,’’ are marketed by the ‘‘cultural industries’’ to white consumers who ‘‘currently support this black culture’’ (181). Granted, in these uses of ‘‘culture’’ Gilroy remains critical of ‘‘absolutist definitions of culture’’ and the process of commodification that culture in turn supports. But his move away from race importantly hinges upon some notion of culture. We may be able to do away with race, but seemingly not with culture.

#### Their role of the ballot argument overextends the political by claiming the debate space represents something more than a competition for a win – this is the same logic as the discourse theory of citizenship which claims every action is political

Rufo and Atchison, 11

(Ken Rufo, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Review of Communication, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2011, pp. 193215)

Laclau (1996) has written about the inherent emptiness at the heart of the hegemonic formulation, and here we would suggest that the political as a conceptual edifice enjoys the same fundamental insolvency. For Laclau, these empty signifiers exist ‘‘because any system of signification is structured around an empty place resulting from the impossibility of producing an object, which, nonetheless, is required by the systematicity of the system’’ (p. 40). An empty signifier structures the relations between agents that comprise the larger system via their relation to each other, but does so while supplying none of the substance that structures those relations. As such, the political has ceased to be a regional category ... the political is, in some sense, the anatomy of the social world, because it is the moment of the institution of the social ... which involves, as we know, the production of empty signifiers in order to unify a multiplicity of heterogeneous demands in equivalential chains. (Laclau, 2005, p. 154) Understood this way, it would be a mistake to think that the political is constituted by an aggregate of individual components: policy makers, citizens, civic institutions, and so on. Instead, the political provides a constitutive conceptual umbrella that then makes possible the thinking of the citizen as that entity, that idiot, that is always already both a member of the body politic and its inadequate and life-threatening missing piece. To summarize, the best way to reconcile the various disciplinary deployments of the citizen thus far culled from the pages of our communication journals is to understand the citizen as epiphenomenal. This is to say that the citizen operates/appears discursively as an after effect of our thinking of the political, or put differently, that the political body produces the individual citizen as a function of its own incompleteness, rather than being the as-yet-incomplete project of a multitude of quasi-functioning citizens. This explanation provides a way of understanding citizens and citizenship commensurate with the use of these terms in our own discipline’s research efforts; the question of whether or not this reflects some objective determination about the contours of politics can be left for others to decide.

#### They continue…..

Asen’s argument proceeds from an acknowledgment of the participation gap we noted previously, and the attendant concerns that American democracy is under threat from an absence of citizen participation. Too often, Asen avers, these discourses key on accounts of what qualifies as citizenship and then proceed to inquire whether these qualities or practices are present in sufficient numbers to indicate a healthy political order. For Asen (2004), this approach dooms itself to failure and obsolescence: ‘‘Rather than asking what counts as citizenship, we should ask: how do people enact citizenship?’’ (p. 191). By focusing on how people enact citizenship, Asen suggests, we can develop a process-oriented, discourse theory of citizenship that sees citizenship as a series or mode of public engagement(s), rather than the specific and rarefied domain of a few privileged acts. Citizens can thus enact their citizenship through practices as diverse as voting, which Asen dubs the ‘‘quintessential act of citizenship’’ (p. 205), blogging, conversing with neighbors, buying a particular cup of coffee, and so on. And the ‘‘so on’’ goes on and on and on; as Asen puts it, a ‘‘mode cannot be contained easily. As a mode citizenship cannot be restricted to certain people, places or topics’’ (p. 195). Hence, the major motivation behind Asen’s work: to think and affirm political subjectivity in a way that minimizes or even precludes the exclusion of citizens from the possibility of public engagement (pp. 192194). He writes that ‘‘a discursive conception of citizenship may offer one case ... of an affirmative articulation of public subjectivity’’ (p. 192). This begs certain questions about the nature of subjectivity, intention, and agency, of course\*questions Asen believes are answered or addressed, in part, by the idea of process and modality. In addition, Asen also makes plain his interest in theorizing ‘‘subjectivity through citizenship, ’’ a claim that effectively circumscribes some of the larger debates about subjectivity by placing them within the context of the process of public engagement in a ‘‘democratic’’ articulation of the political. And we should make clear that, for Asen, the larger horizon against which citizenship is to be understood is that of public engagement and democracy. 6 Asen (2004) writes of situating democracy via the discourse theory of citizenship; he writes of democratic renewal and of democracy’s spirit manifesting ‘‘in its most quotidian enactments’’ (p. 196). Drawing on Dewey’s notion that ‘‘democracy’s the idea of community life itself, ’’ Asen explains that a democracy means that individuals participate, groups work together to liberate ‘‘individual potential, ’’ and that ‘‘human interaction’’ in its broadest sense ‘‘secures democracy’’ (2004, p. 197; 2002, p. 345). The discourse theory of citizenship is at the same time a theorizing (or presupposition) about the nature of the political itself, at least in as much as the political is understood as being broadly democratic, and as an invocation or extrapolation of publicness from what might otherwise be private circumstances (e.g., choosing a consumer good **or debating** with neighbors over dinner).

#### Empirically leads to tyranny and kills resistance

Rufo and Atchison, 11

(Ken Rufo, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Review of Communication, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2011, pp. 193215)

A Fascism of/and the Political If our feeling of foreboding seems absurd, it does so because of two historical trends. The first is the apotheosis of the political in the 19th and 20th centuries, starting with massive spread of enfranchisement and the increasing demand for inclusion within the political process. Hence, slogans like ‘‘everything is politics’’ or ‘‘the personal is political, ’’ wherein the implication is that every action carries with it political realities, consequences, or overtones. One’s choice of church, a kindness to a stranger, the goods or services we consume, the entertainment we enjoy, the food we eat, the way we dress, the way we vote, the way we argue, what we argue about\*all are political acts. The political has become so pervasive that it has become commonplace to assume its status as the unsurpassable master horizon of our age. Carl Schmitt, writing in the early 1930s, was one of the first to warn against the overextension of the political. Its encroachment into areas of life that were not, at one point, obviously political resulted in an interpenetration of the state and society, a condition he called the total state. Therein ostensibly neutral domains\*religion, culture, education, the economy\*then cease to be neutral in the sense that they do not pertain to state and to politics. As a polemical concept against such neutralizations and depoliticalizations of important domains appears the total state, which potentially embraces every domain. This results in the identity of state and society. In such a state, therefore, everything is at least potentially political.... (Schmitt, 1996, p. 22) For advocates of this penetration, what is happening is a recognition of certain political realities, but for Schmitt **the total state made impossible any real accounting of the political**, because in the absence of any sphere absolutely distinct from the political, the political lost its specific meaning. While some might contend that the failure to recognize the political ramifications results in a hidden politics, Schmitt countered, ‘‘In actuality it is the total state which no longer knows anything absolutely nonpolitical...’’ (p. 25). What becomes hidden in the total state, in other words, is the very character of the political itself. For Schmitt, the political is to be defined by the distinction between friend and enemy, a distinction that added significant conceptual clarity but that also misconstrued the limits of the political in its relationship to the community. In some ways, it might be more accurate to suggest that Schmitt offered an historically contingent accounting for the political for the time in which he was writing, wherein the friend and enemy distinction was the sine qua non of international relations. But the friend and the enemy can be more broadly understood as figures that produce particular instantiations of community, of a polis, and that pose that community as a question of relation to other equally posed communities. It is here that the work of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1997) compliments Schmitt, as they understand the political as the question of the figure of a community, or of figuration in general. Put differently, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe see the political ‘‘as the will ... to realize an essence-in-common on the basis of a figure of that in-common’’ (p. xxii). The figure, whatever it might be, or the process of figuration that makes identification with a common figure possible in the first place, constitutes a horizon of intelligibility that overdetermines what we think of as a politics. The figure of the friend, and the figure of the enemy, or the immigrant, or the terrorist, provide a sort of ontological shorthand that produces and structures particular political arrangements. Railing against ‘‘the sense of the obviousness (the blinding obviousness) of politics, the ‘everything is political’...’’ (p. 112), Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe suggest what is needed is a more rigorous questioning and determination of the political, in its specific essence. The figure of the citizen, so prominently on display in the work of our field, prompts exactly these sorts of questions, in that any determination of the citizen is necessarily a determination of the extent and comportment of the political per se.

#### Their political rap reinforces a sexist and homophobic culture - its subtle articulation just make gender roles more defined

Wilt 13

James Wilt, writer for protest music, January 1, 2013, Protest Music was conceived in 2011 as a project of Lokashakti Records, a nonprofit record label based in New York City promoting innovative and incisive political and socially conscious music, Sexism and homophobia in politically conscious rap http://www.protestmusic.org/sexism-and-homophobia-in-politically-conscious-rap/

It’s been a fascinating few years for politically oriented rap. On one hand, emcees have attempted to somewhat dissociate themselves from the “conscious” label — the fantastic Kendrick Lamar put it bluntly on Section.80′s “Ab-Soul’s Outro” by saying, “I’m not the next socially aware rapper,” while renowned social critic Talib Kweli has announced that his still-upcoming LP will be titled Prisoner of Conscious, stating that in contradistinction to his earlier style these songs won’t be “speaking directly to the social conditions.” On the other hand, some of the most successful albums of 2012 have contained overtly political content, with Killer Mike’s R.A.P. Music, Ab-Soul’s #controlsystem and Big K.R.I.T.’s Live from the Underground all attracting critical acclaim. Then, to top it all off, the legendary Too $hort suggested in a February interview with HipHopDX that conscious hip hop had been essentially suffocated by record labels who preferred the profit appeal of caricatured gangsta rap. But amidst all the transitioning of the sub-genre, one thing has remained disappointingly constant: overwhelming sexism and homophobia. It’s certainly not news that such elements exist in rap in general — with authors such as bell hooks, Joan Morgan, Jackson Katz and Michael Eric Dyson having written much about the issue — and ultimately it’s not very difficult to spot in the mainstream. But socially aware rappers, who under normal circumstances are busy protesting the reigning culture, aren’t usually all that much better. The sexism in political rap tends to be more subtle, scattered throughout narratives about unemployment, addiction, police brutality, homelessness, overt racism, failed urban renewal projects, corrupt politicians, and unjust concentrations of wealth. That’s not to say that the usual linguistic suspects aren’t still around; “bitch,” “faggot,” and “ho” are unfortunately still dropped by many talented political rappers. But a quick glance at three socially aware rap songs reveals something more insidious: “Natural Beauty” by Immortal Technique: “And men who don’t even like women control the business / That’s why the women look like men and the men like bitches” “Our Babies (Part II)” by Saigon: “Look, the other day / I seen a girl acting like a boy / Then I seen a little boy acting like a girl / People try to tell me it’s just a way of the world! / It’s a crazy world!” “D.K.N.Y.” by Tech N9ne: “But I ain’t the kinda nigga that just take that lightly like ‘Oh, that’s nothing, that’s normal for a woman to have a dildo’ / My mind goes to, ‘Why do they need it?’ / Cause we absent, then I ask myself why are we absent.” In each of these examples, a common trait is easily noticeable: gender roles are rigidly defined. Men and women are supposed to exclusively “like” and be sexually attracted to the opposite gender, and “look” and “act” in certain ways that honor traditional expressions of masculinity and femininity. What’s remarkable is that on the very same album — sometimes even within the same song — the same rappers critique hegemonic power structures that restrict people due to race and class. There appears to be a mental disconnect between taking on sexism/homophobia and the rest of the issues that such rappers are so extremely talented at addressing. While protesting what are oftentimes the trademarks of mainstream hip hop (consumerism, drug abuse, and violence) political rappers neglect to address the fact that they’re regurgitating the exact principles that make the likes of Eminem and Tyler, the Creator so utterly reprehensible to many people, despite their incredible skill. It’s a dismaying lack of artistic responsibility by such rappers, considering that listeners who tend to buy their albums are yearning for more knowledge than your average Rick Ross or Chief Keef might dispense with their typically misogynistic drivel. Critics tend to be silent on the issue, too, so fault can’t solely be assigned to the political musician But with gender issues increasingly being viewed in the same light as racial injustice, conscious rappers will want to take note sooner rather than later. Since Massachusetts legalized gay marriage in 2003, the turning tide has seen eight more states finally give the nod to same-sex weddings, including most recently Maine, Maryland, and Washington.

#### Hip hop reinforces stereotypes – gives racism a green card

Kitwana, 2 (Bakari, fellow at the Jamestown Project, think tank @ Harvard “The Hip Hop Generation,” p. xxi)

A final obstacle is the unprecedented influence Black youth have achieved through popular culture, especially via the hip-hop phenomenon. Young Blacks have used this access, both in pop film and music, far too much to strengthen associations between Blackness and poverty, while celebrating anti-intellectualism, ignorance, irresponsible parenthood, and criminal lifestyles. This is the paradox: given hip-hop’s growing influence, these *Birth of a Nation-* styled representations receive a free pass from Black leaders and organizations seeking influence with the younger generation. These depictions also escape any real criticism from non-Black critics who, having grown tired of the race card, fear being attacked as racist. Void of open and consistent, criticism, such widely distributed incendiary ideas (what cultural critic Stanley Crouch calls “the new minstrelsy”) reinforce myths of Black inferiority and insulate the new problems in African American culture from redemptive criticism.

#### **Hip hop’s call for a destruction of the system won’t get anybody anywhere – political actions to make real world change are the best and only way to improve the lives of the oppressed**

McWhorter, 8 (John, William Simon Fellow in American Studies at Columbia University, Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Former Associate Professor of Linguistics at U.C. Berkeley and Cornell, Ph.D. in linguistics from Stanford, M.A. in American Studies from NYU, contributing editor to The New Republic and City Journal, All About the Beat: Why Hip-Hop Can’t Save Black America, pp.42-44)

The "message" of hip-hop can be fairly described as saying two things. The first one; "Things really suck." The second: "Things will keep sucking until there is a revolution where the white man finally understands and does a complete 180-degree turn." I see this as a message of weakness and passivity. I see it that way for a very specific reason: there is no logical way that the revolution in question could ever happen. It may be fun to think about, but in the light of day, it is nothing but an idle fantasy. The sixties will not happen again. I say that not because I have some problem with how our Civil Rights heroes made the sixties happen. I say that not because I have some reserved, bourgeois antipathy toward noise. I am not saying that protest is inappropriate. I am saying that the call to turn the system upside down was useful and bore fruit in the fifties and sixties as the result of a chance confluence of several factors that could never occur again. I stress: it was useful and it bore fruit. I fully understand my debt to my elders. It was useful and it bore fruit—then, but now is not then. I am saying that today, the call to turn the system upside down is not effective in addressing the problems we face in our own era, and when wielded, it does little but provide for street theater without actually helping anyone. The problems are different. Real solutions will go far beyond telling white people to stop doing something. Once again; that indeed was the kind of solution that worked in the fifties and sixties. But now it is not. And for that reason, I believe that politics regarding black America that can be classified as revolutionary, radical, or nationalist disregard the very people those politics claim to be concerned about. Rap of a "revolution," of we "niggas" rising up from a cage, and you are preaching a message of defeat, stasis, impotence—because what you are really saying is that black America will only improve when whites again change the way they think. We all know none of that shows any sign of ever happening. It appeals merely in the artistic sense. Rapping “Things suck" and leaving it there is not prophetic but weak. Wack, I might say. It's like someone singing "Twinkle, twinkle, little star" . . . and then just sitting there, as you ache to hear them complete it with "How I wonder what you are." Or, more apropos, imagine Jay-Z on Reasonable Doubt yelling "Can I kick it?" and the track just ending there. Obviously, what's supposed to come next is "Yes, you can!!!!" In other words, on inequality, can we kick it? Yes, we can—if we get back to real civil rights and start fetishizing solutions rather than postures. We get nowhere in thinking that to be political is just to, as it were, "kick it," in the sense of making noise, enjoying the idle self-medication of being angry. Jay-Z accusing the Bush administration of racism in "Minority Report" is one thing, but it is still a static gesture. He’s saying: shit! I seek more than this in something presented to me as politically significant. In 2008, all indications are that black America is going to overcome rather quietly. Definitely but quietly. "Ain't long for you get y'all acres," Black Thought tells us, the subtext being that just over the horizon, blacks will finally get that forty acres and a mule. But no, it's not going to go down that way, not with that brand of drama. Some will never be able to muster much interest in change that happens quietly, gradually—or even definitively. Change it may be, but not interesting. Not worthy of writing articles about. Not worthy of mentioning at book signings. Not the shit. This is because they are wedded to a fantastical notion that change will happen in a way that starkly gets back at "whiteness" and occurs to the kind of beat that gets them moving in their seats. 'These people are, in the end, pleasing themselves rather than thinking seriously about how the nation operates and how to carve a space within it where black people who need help can get it. Those of us interested in helping people— which is different from Utopian leftist incantations—must walk on by. What really helps people? Frankly, it has no beat. You can't dance to it. It isn't in anyone's face. It is, in a word—a word used in an original sense that hip-hop has distracted us from—real. REASONS FOR HOPE Snapping our necks to beats and rhymes will have no effect on what happens in the congressional chamber. But all is not lost. Unlike in 1920, we have the advantage that the Civil Rights revolution did happen forty years ago, and mainstream attitudes in America did change. They did not change in such a way as to be interested in a black Civil Rights revolution occurring again. But as the result of awareness of the first one, philanthropists are wide open to funding efforts targeted at poor black people. Grassroots organizations like the Harlem Children's Zone are supported in part by rich white people, after all. Corporations are behind organizations like this in any city: in Indianapolis, Christamore House, helping turn lives around in the inner city, is backed by Eli Lilly. In 1920, to most people with money, black uplift efforts sounded about as important as saving spotted owls. Washington may not be set to apply a Marshall Plan to black ghettoes—and it's not an easy question as to just where the funds would go under such a plan (e.g., recall that flooding bad schools with money results in well-funded bad schools). However, Washington does create programs like No Child Left Behind, the Faith-Based Initiatives, the Second Chance Act reintegrating ex-cons into society, and the Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act. There are flaws in all of them. But in 1920 all of them would have sounded like something from the fourth dimension. As they would have as late as 1990. As late as 2000, efforts that have now culminated in the Second Chance Act were seen as rewarding the "undeserving poor." We have something to work with today. Of course racism is still around. But in deciding what is possible today, black people must do their grandparents the courtesy of remembering what America was like in the old days. In this, black people will also do themselves a courtesy, in working from what is constructive and positive about our times. Smoking out one more indication that racism is still alive in subliminal ways must be less interesting to us than coping, dealing, building. If black people did this when they weren't even allowed to eat with white people in public, then surely we can do this now. Pretend that black people need the total eclipse of racism to do anything better than okay, and you are disappointing the spirits of our elders.

# 2NC

## **Anthro**

Anthropocentrism outweighs

Gottlieb 94 — Roger S. Gottlieb, Professor of Humanities at Worcester Polytechnic Institute, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Brandeis University, 1994 (“Ethics and Trauma: Levinas, Feminism, and Deep Ecology,” *Crosscurrents: A Journal of Religion and Intellectual Life*, Summer, Available Online at http://www.crosscurrents.org/feministecology.htm, Accessed 07-26-2011)

Here I will at least begin in agreement with Levinas. As he rejects an ethics proceeding on the basis of self-interest, so I believe the anthropocentric perspectives of conservation or liberal environmentalism cannot take us far enough. Our relations with nonhuman nature are poisoned and not just because we have set up feedback loops that already lead to mass starvations, skyrocketing environmental disease rates, and devastation of natural resources. The problem with ecocide is not just that it hurts human beings. Our uncaring violence also violates the very ground of our being, our natural body, our home. Such violence is done not simply to the other – as if the rainforest, the river, the atmosphere, the species made extinct are totally different from ourselves. Rather, we have crucified ourselves-in-relation-to-the-other, fracturing a mode of being in which self and other can no more be conceived as fully in isolation from each other than can a mother and a nursing child. We are that child, and nonhuman nature is that mother. If this image seems too maudlin, let us remember that other lactating women can feed an infant, but we have only one earth mother. What moral stance will be shaped by our personal sense that we are poisoning ourselves, our environment, and so many kindred spirits of the air, water, and forests? To begin, we may see this tragic situation as setting the limits to Levinas's perspective. The other which is nonhuman nature is not simply known by a "trace," nor is it something of which all knowledge is necessarily instrumental. This other is inside us as well as outside us. We prove it with every breath we take, every bit of food we eat, every glass of water we drink. We do not have to find shadowy traces on or in the faces of trees or lakes, topsoil or air: we are made from them. Levinas denies this sense of connection with nature. Our "natural" side represents for him a threat of simple consumption or use of the other, a spontaneous response which must be obliterated by the power of ethics in general (and, for him in particular, Jewish religious law(23) ). A "natural" response lacks discipline; without the capacity to heed the call of the other, unable to sublate the self's egoism. Worship of nature would ultimately result in an "everything-is-permitted" mentality, a close relative of Nazism itself. For Levinas, to think of people as "natural" beings is to assimilate them to a totality, a category or species which makes no room for the kind of individuality required by ethics.(24) He refers to the "elemental" or the "there is" as unmanaged, unaltered, "natural" conditions or forces that are essentially alien to the categories and conditions of moral life.(25) One can only lament that Levinas has read nature -- as to some extent (despite his intentions) he has read selfhood -- through the lens of masculine culture. It is precisely our sense of belonging to nature as system, as interaction, as interdependence, which can provide the basis for an ethics appropriate to the trauma of ecocide. As cultural feminism sought to expand our sense of personal identity to a sense of inter-identification with the human other, so this ecological ethics would expand our personal and species sense of identity into an inter-identification with the natural world. Such a realization can lead us to an ethics appropriate to our time, a dimension of which has come to be known as "deep ecology."(26) For this ethics, we do not begin from the uniqueness of our human selfhood, existing against a taken-for-granted background of earth and sky. Nor is our body somehow irrelevant to ethical relations, with knowledge of it reduced always to tactics of domination. Our knowledge does not assimilate the other to the same, but reveals and furthers the continuing dance of interdependence. And our ethical motivation is neither rationalist system nor individualistic self-interest, but a sense of connection to all of life. The deep ecology sense of self-realization goes beyond the modern Western sense of "self" as an isolated ego striving for hedonistic gratification. . . . . Self, in this sense, is experienced as integrated with the whole of nature.(27) Having gained distance and sophistication of perception [from the development of science and political freedoms] we can turn and recognize who we have been all along. . . . we are our world knowing itself. We can relinquish our separateness. We can come home again -- and participate in our world in a richer, more responsible and poignantly beautiful way.(28) Ecological ways of knowing nature are necessarily participatory. [This] knowledge is ecological and plural, reflecting both the diversity of natural ecosystems and the diversity in cultures that nature-based living gives rise to. The recovery of the feminine principle is based on inclusiveness. It is a recovery in nature, woman and man of creative forms of being and perceiving. In nature it implies seeing nature as a live organism. In woman it implies seeing women as productive and active. Finally, in men the recovery of the feminine principle implies a relocation of action and activity to create life-enhancing, not life-reducing and life-threatening societies.(29) In this context, the knowing ego is not set against a world it seeks to control, but one of which it is a part. To continue the feminist perspective, the mother knows or seeks to know the child's needs. Does it make sense to think of her answering the call of the child in abstraction from such knowledge? Is such knowledge necessarily domination? Or is it essential to a project of care, respect and love, precisely because the knower has an intimate, emotional connection with the known?(30) Our ecological vision locates us in such close relation with our natural home that knowledge of it is knowledge of ourselves. And this is not, contrary to Levinas's fear, reducing the other to the same, but a celebration of a larger, more inclusive, and still complex and articulated self.(31) The noble and terrible burden of Levinas's individuated responsibility for sheer existence gives way to a different dream, a different prayer: Being rock, being gas, being mist, being Mind, Being the mesons traveling among the galaxies with the speed of light, You have come here, my beloved one. . . . You have manifested yourself as trees, as grass, as butterflies, as single-celled beings, and as chrysanthemums; but the eyes with which you looked at me this morning tell me you have never died.(32) In this prayer, we are, quite simply, all in it together. And, although this new ecological Holocaust -- this creation of planet Auschwitz – is under way, it is not yet final. We have time to step back from the brink, to repair our world. But only if we see that world not as another across an irreducible gap of loneliness and unchosen obligation, but as a part of ourselves as we are part of it, to be redeemed not out of duty, but out of love; neither for ourselves nor for the other, but for us all.

**Total rejection is key**  
**Kochi and Ordan 08** – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3\_2008/kochiordan\_argument.pdf)  
  
Both liberal and social revolutionary models thus seem to run into the same problems that surround the notion of progress; each play out a modern discourse of sacrifice in which some forms of life and modes of living are set aside in favour of the promise of a future good. Caught between social hopes and political myths, the challenge of responding to environmental destruction confronts, starkly, the core of a discourse of modernity characterised by reflection, responsibility and action. Given the increasing pressures upon the human habitat, this modern discourse will either deliver or it will fail. There is little room for an existence in between: either the Enlightenment fulfils its potentiality or it shows its hand as the bearer of impossibility. If the possibilities of the Enlightenment are to be fulfilled then this can *only* happen if the old idea of the progress of the human species, exemplified by Hawking’s cosmic colonisation, is fundamentally rethought and replaced by a new form of self-comprehension. This self-comprehension would need to negate and limit the old modern humanism by a radical anti-humanism. The aim, however, would be to not just accept one side or the other, but to re-think the basis of moral action along the lines of a dialectical, utopian anti-humanism. Importantly, though, getting past inadequate conceptions of action, historical time and the futural promise of progress may be dependent upon radically re-comprehending the relationship between humanity and nature in such a way that the human is no longer viewed as the sole core of the subject, or the being of highest value. The human would thus need to no longer be thought of as a master that stands over the non-human. Rather, the human and the non-human need to be grasped together, with the former bearing dignity only so long as it understands itself as a part of the latter.

**Complicity in the institutional and bureaucratic structures of human modernity locks you in the banality of evil. You are like the Nazi collaborators who, while they didn’t directly murder Jews, were nonetheless complicity in atrocity.**  
Kochi and Ordan 08 – (Dec. 2008, Tarik Kochi, PhD, Lecturer in Law & International Security, University of Sussex, Noam Ordan, linguist and translator, conducts research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan University, research focus on human cultural history, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity,” Borderlands, <http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol7no3_2008/kochiordan_argument.pdf>)  
  
In one sense, the human individual’s modern complicity in environmental violence represents something of a bizarre symmetry to Hannah Arendt’s notion of the ‘banality of evil’ (Arendt, 1994). For Arendt, the Nazi regime was an emblem of modernity, being a collection of official institutions (scientific, educational, military etc.) in which citizens and soldiers alike served as clerks in a bureaucratic mechanism run by the state. These individuals committed evil, but they did so in a very banal manner: fitting into the state mechanism, following orders, filling in paperwork, working in factories, driving trucks and generally respecting the rule of law. In this way perhaps all individuals within the modern industrial world carry out a banal evil against the environment simply by going to work, sitting in their offices and living in homes attached to a power grid. Conversely, those individuals who are driven by a moral intention to not do evil and act so as to save the environment, are drawn back into a banality of the good. By their ability to effect change in only very small aspects of their daily life, or in political-social life more generally, modern individuals are forced to participate in the active destruction of the environment even if they are the voices of contrary intention. What is ‘banal’ in this sense is not the lack of a definite moral intention but, rather, the way in which the individual’s or institution’s participation in everyday modern life, and the unintentional contribution to environmental destruction therein, contradicts and counteracts the smaller acts of good intention. The banality of action hits against a central problem of social-political action within late modernity. In one sense, the ethical demand to respond to historical and present environmental destruction opens onto a difficulty within the relationship between moral intention and autonomy. While an individual might be autonomous in respect of moral conscience, their fundamental interconnection with and interdependence upon social, political and economic orders strips them of the power to make and act upon truly autonomous decisions. From this perspective it is not only the modern humanist figures such as Hawking who perpetuate present violence and present dreams of colonial speciesist violence in the future. It is also those who might reject this violence but whose lives and actions are caught up in a certain complicity for this violence. From a variety of political standpoints, it would seem that the issue of modern, autonomous action runs into difficulties of systematic and institutional complicity. Certainly both individuals and groups are expected to give up a degree of autonomy in a modern liberal-democratic context. In this instance, giving up autonomy (in the sense of autonomy as sovereignty) is typically done in exchange for the hope or promise of at some point having some degree of control or influence (i.e. via the electoral system) over government policy. The price of this hope or promise, however, is continued complicity in government-sanctioned social, political and economic actions that temporarily (or in the worst case, eternally) lie beyond the individual’s choice and control. The answer to the questions of whether such complicity might ever be institutionally overcome, and the problems of human violence against non-human species and ongoing environmental destruction effectively dealt with, often depends upon whether one believes that the liberal hope or promise is, either valid and worthwhile, or false and a sham. [8]

The affirmative’s valorization of “human rights” is not natural – it is explicitly anthropocentric and is the foundation of the dichotomy between “human” and the “environment”

Burdon 12 (Peter Burdon – PhD in Earth Jurisprudence and lecturer at Alelaide Law School, August 10, 2010, “ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS TALK”, http://rightnow.org.au/topics/environment/environmental-protection-and-the-limits-of-rights-talk/) //MD

The rise of environmental human rights

During the 1970s the language of human rights began to make sense to broad communities of people as an “umbrella concept” for combating multiple forms of injustice. Most recently, there has been an attempt to extend human rights for environmental protection. There are two main arguments. First, that human beings have a right to a healthy environment i.e. a right to clean water. Second, that there are ecological limitations to human rights. While not yet implemented in “hard law” the latter argument refers to the idea that individual freedom is not only determined by a social context – but also by an ecological context.¶ Human rights discourse has assumed hegemonic status and is widely billed as “the only game in town” for environmental protection. Yet, many commentators have voiced serious concerns that a human rights model cannot address the root causes of environmental exploitation. To begin, the approach is overtly anthropocentric. Even the phrase “human rights and the environment” is species specific, focuses on “rights” which is an inherently individualistic concept and sets up an immediate dichotomy between the “human” and the “environment”.¶ Linguistics aside, **the very existence of environmental human rights reinforces the idea that the environment and natural resources exist only for human benefit and have no intrinsic worth.** In the example I cited above concerning groundwater pollution, my discussant’s rebuff could easily be viewed as consistent with the ethical framework of environmental human rights. Indeed, no human rights were being infringed, so what is the problem? Thus, while the language of environmental human rights has been seen as a politically useful tool for environmental groups to sway public opinion, it does not fundamentally challenge the mental ideas that partially explain environmental exploitation.¶ A second major critique of environmental human rights is that it seeks to adopt bourgeois legal concepts and treat them as both universal and foundational for the development of an alternative social form. In reality, this is no alternative at all since it merely re-inscribes dominant conceptions of value in a supposedly new framework. Foundational documents for environmental human rights discourse, such as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Right (1948), have also been used as central documents for market-based individualism. As such, it is doubtful whether they can provide the basis for a thoroughgoing critique of liberal or neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, whether it is politically useful to insist that the capitalist political order live up to its own foundational principles is one thing, but to imagine that this politics can lead to a radical displacement of capitalist growth economics is a serious error.

#### a. that destroys switch side debate’s unique value as a lab for intellectual experiment

Muir 93

(Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS

A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism, Stewart, for example, sees value clarification as individualistic, personal, and situational.^' He also characterizes values clarification as possessing a hidden set of values (an "absolute relativism") that includes purposefulness, strong beliefs, and thoughtfulness, among others. This "hidden curriculum" of values clarification formulates responses to situations while decrying such pre-judgment. In obvious ways, switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others as a matter of procedure. Both features need to be explicitly addressed since both reflect directly on debate as a tool of moral pedagogy. The first response to the charge of relativism is that switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems. Scriven argues that the "confusion of pluralism, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, with relativism—the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion—is perhaps the most serious ideological barrier to the implementation of moral education today. "^ The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not. Here is where cognitive-development diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable: It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.

#### Their role of the ballot argument overextends the political by claiming the debate space represents something more than a competition for a win – this is the same logic as the discourse theory of citizenship which claims every action is political

Rufo and Atchison, 11

(Ken Rufo, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Review of Communication, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2011, pp. 193215)

Laclau (1996) has written about the inherent emptiness at the heart of the hegemonic formulation, and here we would suggest that the political as a conceptual edifice enjoys the same fundamental insolvency. For Laclau, these empty signifiers exist ‘‘because any system of signification is structured around an empty place resulting from the impossibility of producing an object, which, nonetheless, is required by the systematicity of the system’’ (p. 40). An empty signifier structures the relations between agents that comprise the larger system via their relation to each other, but does so while supplying none of the substance that structures those relations. As such, the political has ceased to be a regional category ... the political is, in some sense, the anatomy of the social world, because it is the moment of the institution of the social ... which involves, as we know, the production of empty signifiers in order to unify a multiplicity of heterogeneous demands in equivalential chains. (Laclau, 2005, p. 154) Understood this way, it would be a mistake to think that the political is constituted by an aggregate of individual components: policy makers, citizens, civic institutions, and so on. Instead, the political provides a constitutive conceptual umbrella that then makes possible the thinking of the citizen as that entity, that idiot, that is always already both a member of the body politic and its inadequate and life-threatening missing piece. To summarize, the best way to reconcile the various disciplinary deployments of the citizen thus far culled from the pages of our communication journals is to understand the citizen as epiphenomenal. This is to say that the citizen operates/appears discursively as an after effect of our thinking of the political, or put differently, that the political body produces the individual citizen as a function of its own incompleteness, rather than being the as-yet-incomplete project of a multitude of quasi-functioning citizens. This explanation provides a way of understanding citizens and citizenship commensurate with the use of these terms in our own discipline’s research efforts; the question of whether or not this reflects some objective determination about the contours of politics can be left for others to decide.

#### They continue…..

Asen’s argument proceeds from an acknowledgment of the participation gap we noted previously, and the attendant concerns that American democracy is under threat from an absence of citizen participation. Too often, Asen avers, these discourses key on accounts of what qualifies as citizenship and then proceed to inquire whether these qualities or practices are present in sufficient numbers to indicate a healthy political order. For Asen (2004), this approach dooms itself to failure and obsolescence: ‘‘Rather than asking what counts as citizenship, we should ask: how do people enact citizenship?’’ (p. 191). By focusing on how people enact citizenship, Asen suggests, we can develop a process-oriented, discourse theory of citizenship that sees citizenship as a series or mode of public engagement(s), rather than the specific and rarefied domain of a few privileged acts. Citizens can thus enact their citizenship through practices as diverse as voting, which Asen dubs the ‘‘quintessential act of citizenship’’ (p. 205), blogging, conversing with neighbors, buying a particular cup of coffee, and so on. And the ‘‘so on’’ goes on and on and on; as Asen puts it, a ‘‘mode cannot be contained easily. As a mode citizenship cannot be restricted to certain people, places or topics’’ (p. 195). Hence, the major motivation behind Asen’s work: to think and affirm political subjectivity in a way that minimizes or even precludes the exclusion of citizens from the possibility of public engagement (pp. 192194). He writes that ‘‘a discursive conception of citizenship may offer one case ... of an affirmative articulation of public subjectivity’’ (p. 192). This begs certain questions about the nature of subjectivity, intention, and agency, of course\*questions Asen believes are answered or addressed, in part, by the idea of process and modality. In addition, Asen also makes plain his interest in theorizing ‘‘subjectivity through citizenship, ’’ a claim that effectively circumscribes some of the larger debates about subjectivity by placing them within the context of the process of public engagement in a ‘‘democratic’’ articulation of the political. And we should make clear that, for Asen, the larger horizon against which citizenship is to be understood is that of public engagement and democracy. 6 Asen (2004) writes of situating democracy via the discourse theory of citizenship; he writes of democratic renewal and of democracy’s spirit manifesting ‘‘in its most quotidian enactments’’ (p. 196). Drawing on Dewey’s notion that ‘‘democracy’s the idea of community life itself, ’’ Asen explains that a democracy means that individuals participate, groups work together to liberate ‘‘individual potential, ’’ and that ‘‘human interaction’’ in its broadest sense ‘‘secures democracy’’ (2004, p. 197; 2002, p. 345). The discourse theory of citizenship is at the same time a theorizing (or presupposition) about the nature of the political itself, at least in as much as the political is understood as being broadly democratic, and as an invocation or extrapolation of publicness from what might otherwise be private circumstances (e.g., choosing a consumer good **or debating** with neighbors over dinner).

#### Empirically leads to tyranny and kills resistance

Rufo and Atchison, 11

(Ken Rufo, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Jarrod Atchison, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of Georgia, Review of Communication, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2011, pp. 193215)

A Fascism of/and the Political If our feeling of foreboding seems absurd, it does so because of two historical trends. The first is the apotheosis of the political in the 19th and 20th centuries, starting with massive spread of enfranchisement and the increasing demand for inclusion within the political process. Hence, slogans like ‘‘everything is politics’’ or ‘‘the personal is political, ’’ wherein the implication is that every action carries with it political realities, consequences, or overtones. One’s choice of church, a kindness to a stranger, the goods or services we consume, the entertainment we enjoy, the food we eat, the way we dress, the way we vote, the way we argue, what we argue about\*all are political acts. The political has become so pervasive that it has become commonplace to assume its status as the unsurpassable master horizon of our age. Carl Schmitt, writing in the early 1930s, was one of the first to warn against the overextension of the political. Its encroachment into areas of life that were not, at one point, obviously political resulted in an interpenetration of the state and society, a condition he called the total state. Therein ostensibly neutral domains\*religion, culture, education, the economy\*then cease to be neutral in the sense that they do not pertain to state and to politics. As a polemical concept against such neutralizations and depoliticalizations of important domains appears the total state, which potentially embraces every domain. This results in the identity of state and society. In such a state, therefore, everything is at least potentially political.... (Schmitt, 1996, p. 22) For advocates of this penetration, what is happening is a recognition of certain political realities, but for Schmitt **the total state made impossible any real accounting of the political**, because in the absence of any sphere absolutely distinct from the political, the political lost its specific meaning. While some might contend that the failure to recognize the political ramifications results in a hidden politics, Schmitt countered, ‘‘In actuality it is the total state which no longer knows anything absolutely nonpolitical...’’ (p. 25). What becomes hidden in the total state, in other words, is the very character of the political itself. For Schmitt, the political is to be defined by the distinction between friend and enemy, a distinction that added significant conceptual clarity but that also misconstrued the limits of the political in its relationship to the community. In some ways, it might be more accurate to suggest that Schmitt offered an historically contingent accounting for the political for the time in which he was writing, wherein the friend and enemy distinction was the sine qua non of international relations. But the friend and the enemy can be more broadly understood as figures that produce particular instantiations of community, of a polis, and that pose that community as a question of relation to other equally posed communities. It is here that the work of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1997) compliments Schmitt, as they understand the political as the question of the figure of a community, or of figuration in general. Put differently, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe see the political ‘‘as the will ... to realize an essence-in-common on the basis of a figure of that in-common’’ (p. xxii). The figure, whatever it might be, or the process of figuration that makes identification with a common figure possible in the first place, constitutes a horizon of intelligibility that overdetermines what we think of as a politics. The figure of the friend, and the figure of the enemy, or the immigrant, or the terrorist, provide a sort of ontological shorthand that produces and structures particular political arrangements. Railing against ‘‘the sense of the obviousness (the blinding obviousness) of politics, the ‘everything is political’...’’ (p. 112), Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe suggest what is needed is a more rigorous questioning and determination of the political, in its specific essence. The figure of the citizen, so prominently on display in the work of our field, prompts exactly these sorts of questions, in that any determination of the citizen is necessarily a determination of the extent and comportment of the political per se.

# 1NR

## FW

**First, a stasis point is the necessary precondition for examining any issue**

**Hanghoj 8**

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of

Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have

taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the

Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

According to Eugene Matusov, classroom examples of authoritative discourse also include “intolerance, speaking for others, an unwillingness to listen to and genuinely question others, the failure to test one’s own ideas and assumptions, and the desire to impose one’s own views on others” (Matusov, 2007: 231). Internally persuasive discourse, in contrast, refers to language use directed towards mutual communication and the mutual construction of knowledge: “In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and halfsomeone- else's” (Bakhtin, 1981: 345). In this way, internally persuasive discourse marks a **creative border zone** based on the **impossibility of any word ever being final**, and for this reason it is “able to reveal ever newer ways to mean” (Bakhtin, 1981: 346). **But internally persuasive discourse cannot be reduced to the mere “appropriation” of the ideas and words of others**, as it r**equires** the ability to be involved in and embody how “diverse voices collide with each other in a **dialogue that tests these ideas”** (Matusov, 2007: 230). Thus, internally persuasive discourse **always requires** some form of dialogical and critical exposure that can be supported by the interplay of different voices in a classroom setting. The application of Bakhtin’s terms to classroom contexts can be quite **problematic** as the two terms easily end up as an **unproductive dichotomy** between **authoritative (“bad”)** and **persuasive (“good”)** discourse. Bakhtin scholar Gary Saul Morson has tried to further elaborate the two concepts and argues that internally persuasive discourse **cannot** be sustained in a classroom **without authority** (Morson, 2004).21 Quite simply, **it is impossible** to create shared classroom attention **solely on the basis of internally persuasive discourse**.

**Second, Lack of preparation makes their advocacy meaningless**

Gerald Graff, University of English& Education, University of Illinois at Chicago, Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures The Life of The Mind, ‘3, p. 11-12

But an even more important point that some readers of my work have missed is that the ultimate motivation of my argument for teaching the conflicts is the need to clarify academic culture, not just to resolve spats among academics or cultural factions. My assumption is that an institution as rife with conflicts as the American school and college can clarify itself only by making its ideological differences coherent. But even if our cultural and educational scene were a less contentious place than it is, the centrality of controversy to learning would still need to be stressed. For there exists a deep cognitive connection between controversy and intelligibility. John Stuart Mill pointed up the connection when he observed that we do not understand our own ideas until we know what can be said against them. In Mill's words, those who "have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them ... do not, in any proper sense of the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess."9 In other words, our very ability to think depends on contrast-on asking "as opposed to what?" This "dialogical" or contrastive character of human cognition has long been a given of modern thought, but the academic curriculum with its self isolated courses has yet to reflect it. When schooling is bad or dull, it is often because the curriculum effaces this element of contrast or as-opposed-to-whatness from students' view. the academic habit of evading conflict helps obscure the life of the mind.

**Third, the disregard of rules turns adversaries into enemies and games into conflicts. If anyone is running from the battle, it’s them**

Tally, English – Texas State University, ‘7

(Robert T, “The Agony of the Political,” Post Modern Culture 17.2)

Mouffe's image of a we/they politics in which collective identities vie with one another for hegemony looks a bit like organized sports. Consider the football game: rival sides squared off in a unambiguously agonistic struggle for dominance, with a clear winner and loser, yet agreeing to play by certain shared rules, and above all unwilling to destroy the sport itself (i.e., the political association) in order to achieve the side's particular goals. Football teams have no interest in dialogue, and the goal is not consensus, but victory. The winner is triumphant, and the loser must regroup, practice, and try again later. A clearly defined "we" will fight against the "they," but the aim is to win, not to destroy "them" or the sport itself. But, noteworthy in the extended metaphor, some organizing body (rarely democratic) has established the rules and standards by which the sport is played. The players have no say in how the game is structured.

If the sports analogy seems too facile, consider Mouffe's own characterization. Responding to the "fundamental question for democratic theory" (i.e., how to maintain antagonism in politics without destroying political association), Mouffe answers that it requires distinguishing between the categories of "antagonism" (relations between enemies) and "agonism" (relations between adversaries) and envisaging a sort of "conflictual consensus" providing a common symbolic space among opponents who are considered "legitimate enemies." Contrary to the dialogic approach, the democratic debate is conceived as a real confrontation. Adversaries do fight--even fiercely--but according to a shared set of rules, and their positions, despite being ultimately irreconcilable, and accepted as legitimate perspectives. (52)

Play ball! Of course this means that, if the opposition party--oh, let's go ahead and call them the Reds--wishes to change the relations of power, it must do so within the political framework (e.g., legislative body or rules of the game). To be outside of the framework is to not be playing the game at all.

A better model might be that of games on the playground. On the playground, children both organize and play games, often coming up with and changing the rules as they go along. Their power relations are constantly adjusted, modified so as to make the game more fair ("you get a head start"), more safe ("no hitting"), more interesting ("three points if you can make it from behind that line"), and so on. The overall structure of the game does not necessarily change, but the specifics of how the game is played can vary. This is not a utopian vision, obviously. The power relations on display at most playgrounds are not the most salutary. But this model at least provides an image of what a radical version of Mouffe's agonistic, democratic politics might look like. How this would work outside the playground, in a global political context, is a different question. Can we get the world's diverse "teams" together on the same playground? Would a multipolar world system enable multiple grounds for playing? Who would or would not be allowed to play? Who would decide?

These practical questions are exceedingly tough to answer. The agonistic model of politics requires an arena where contestants can hold competitions. It requires rules that may be altered but that also must be in place in order to know what game is being played. And it requires a system that allows the sport to continue when particular games end. (That is, the winner cannot cancel further contests, a problem that has plagued nascent democracies.) A radical democracy founded on adversarial politics cannot simply replicate existing structures of liberal, parliamentary democracy. It must change the game.

**PRECONDITION for education**

**Hanghoj 8**

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

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professor.

4.2.1. Play and imagination

Among educational theorists, John Dewey is well-known for stressing the learning potential of play and game activities within education (Makedon, 1993; Vaage, 2000). Thus, Dewey devotes an entire chapter in Democracy and Education to “Play and Work in the Curriculum”. In tune with the main argument presented throughout the book, he begins the chapter by noting that it is “desirable” that education, as such, starts “from and with the experience and capacities of learners” (Dewey, 1916: 202). This can be done through the “the introduction of forms of activity, in play and work, similar to those in which children and youth engage outside of school” (Dewey, 1916: 202). Dewey makes no fundamental distinction between play and work activities, as they “both involve ends consciously entertained and the selection and adaptation of materials and processes designed to affect the desired ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). Thus, play and work mostly differ in terms of “timespans”, which “influence the directness of means and ends” (Dewey, 1916: 210). In this sense, play and work activities simply represent two different aspects on a continuum of meaningful relations between ends and means. This assertion also goes against the commonsensical notion that play is goal-free or is an end in itself. In summary, Dewey views play as being meaningful, goal-oriented, and interestbased. Moreover, play is free and plastic as it is both directed toward present and future (projected) activities (cf. chapter 2). However, in order to realise the educational value of play it is necessary to understand play as an imaginative activity (Dewey, 1916: 245). Play activities are too important to be reduced to a purely developmental phenomenon among children: It is still usual to regard this [imaginative] activity as a specially marked-off stage of childish growth, and to overlook the fact that the difference between play and what is regarded as serious employment should be not a difference between the presence and absence of imagination, but a difference in the materials with which imagination is occupied (Dewey, 1916: 245). In this way, play is closely linked with the imagination, which is “the medium of realization of every kind of thing which lies beyond the scope of direct physical response” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Put differently, Dewey’s conception of imagination represents “the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could be” (Fesmire, 2003: 65). Thus, the educational value of play activities must be based on the understanding that: The imagination is as much a normal and integral part of human activity as is muscular movement. The educative value of manual activities and of laboratory exercises, as well as of play, depends upon the extent in which they aid in bringing about a sensing of the meaning of what is going on. In effect, if not in name, they are dramatizations. Their utilitarian value in forming habits of skill to be used for tangible results is important, but not when isolated from the appreciative side. Were it not for the accompanying play of imagination, there would be no road from a direct activity to representative knowledge; for it is by imagination that symbols are translated over into a direct meaning and integrated with a narrower activity so as to expand and enrich it (Dewey, 1916: 245-6; my emphasis added). Play activity as such is no guarantee for avoiding “mechanical methods in teaching” (Dewey, 1916: 245). Thus, the value of educational gaming is entirely dependent upon whether the imaginative aspects of play are able to support students understanding of “what is going on”. In this way, imaginative play allows meaning to be created through “dramatizations” of particular aspects of knowledge. Consequently, the presumably distinct categories of imagination and reality represent a subtle continuum of finely graded experience as human beings do not experience reality directly but always through symbols, language, and social interaction (Waskul & Lust, 2004

**Fairness exists to ensure participation from both sides – our framework allows for storytelling, they just have to ground it in a topical affirmative**

**Burch, 8** - Assistant Professor, Cumberland School of Law (Elizabeth, “CAFA'S IMPACT ON LITIGATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD” 29 Cardozo L. Rev. 2517, May, lexis)

Given this shortcoming, the second procedural justice component is fairness. Fairness arguments are typically offered as policy reasons to trump pursuit of certain reform proposals and aggregate social goals; n101 however, I use fairness here (and in assessing CAFA) as a supplemental constraint rather than a substitute. Employing a deontological conception of fairness to balance utility aids in, not only distributing procedural costs and correcting procedural errors, but also in ensuring that the procedural system does not disproportionately favor or burden plaintiffs or defendants. n102 Put differently, process should disperse the risk of error and the cost of access as evenly as possible. Neither party [\*2535] should have an advantage. n103 This idea of "fairness" as avoiding lopsided distribution of error can be likened to the concept of "neutrality." n104 To be sure, some imparity in distributing risks may be inevitable.

Finally, although analogous to fairness, participation - manifested as adequate representation in the class context - humanizes process. n105 In its simplest form, participation necessitates that those who are bound by a decision have an opportunity to take part (and be heard) in adjudication. n106 Moreover, it encompasses inherent rights to present evidence, observe the proceedings, cross-examine witnesses, and hear the judge's decision. n107 And participation, even in class litigation, affords litigants dignity by granting them a forum in which to tell their story. n108 "Storytelling" has been criticized when used to demonstrate satisfaction with process as a proxy for "justice." n109 I use the term here, however, for its cathartic value only when situated within this larger [\*2536] procedural fairness framework.